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The	death	of	‘business	as	usual’	in	the	EU
European	integration	was	once	thought	of	as	a	largely	technocratic	process	built	around	consensus,	but
the	last	decade	has	seen	the	work	of	the	EU’s	institutions	become	heavily	politicised.	Presenting
evidence	from	a	new	study,	Reinout	van	der	Veer	highlights	just	how	pervasive	the	effect	of	this
politicisation	has	been.
Our	post-Brexit	era	makes	it	hard	to	imagine	that	there	was	once	a	time	in	which	academia	portrayed
the	European	Union	as	a	technocratic,	expertise-driven	polity	that	merely	offered	pareto-efficient	answers	to	border-
crossing	questions.	This	consensus	has	now	been	shattered.	Beginning	with	the	seminal	work	of	Liesbeth	Hooghe
and	Gary	Marks	in	2009,	academics	have	developed	a	greater	understanding	of	the	extent	to	which	public	opinion
and	domestic	politics	matter	for	EU-level	outcomes.	Various	studies	have	since	documented	how	the	politicisation	of
European	integration	(the	rise	in	salience	of,	polarisation	of	opinions	on,	and	political	mobilisation	on	EU	affairs)
affects	EU	politics.
But	we	still	implicitly	assume	the	most	insulated	parts	of	the	EU	system	continue	to	operate	on	the	basis	of	those	old
technocratic	principles.	By	shifting	the	focus	to	the	more	mundane	process	of	the	implementation	of	EU	policy	by	EU
institutions,	a	new	study	that	I	have	co-authored	with	Markus	Haverland	sheds	light	on	just	how	pervasive	the	effect
of	politicisation	on	the	working	of	the	EU	is.
We	have	examined	whether	the	European	Commission	differentiates	its	treatment	of	member	states	based	on	the
level	of	politicisation	of	its	activities	in	these	member	states.	As	we	already	know,	the	Commission	is	responsive	to
such	pressures	in	its	role	as	initiator	of	EU	legislation.	We	wanted	to	know	whether	it	is	responsive	in	its	more	routine
and	insulated	role	as	supranational	watchdog.
To	this	end,	we	examined	the	effects	of	this	politicisation	on	the	main	outputs	of	the	European	Semester,	the
Country-Specific	Recommendations	(CSRs),	as	proposed	by	the	Commission.	These	CSRs	have	been	issued
annually	to	all	member	states	since	2011,	and	seek	to	address	current	and	emerging	threats	to	a	member	state’s
economy	and	fiscal	stance.
Figure	1:	Predicted	values	for	number	of	words
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	journal	article.
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Figure	2:	Predicted	values	for	share	of	social	CSRs
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	journal	article.
Our	most	striking	findings	are	presented	in	the	figures	above.	These	graphs	visualise	the	effects	of	rising	levels	of
polarisation	of	public	opinion	on	the	EU	(indicated	by	lower	levels	of	‘kurtosis’)	on	both	the	scope	and	substance	of
these	Country-Specific	Recommendations.	First,	taking	the	number	of	words	as	a	measure	of	the	scope	of	the	EU’s
interference	in	national	affairs,	we	find	that	the	Commission	issues	more	extensive	recommendations	to	member
states	in	which	the	Commission’s	legitimacy	is	more	strongly	contested.
Second,	we	find	that	the	share	of	recommendations	advocating	social	investment	(i.e.	capacitating	social	policies)
over	social	retrenchment	(i.e.	austerity)	is	lower	for	these	countries.	Thus,	the	Commission	is	not	trying	to	bribe	the
publics	of	more	Eurosceptic	member	states	by	arguing	for	more	spending	and	protection	for	disadvantaged	groups.
Instead,	we	find	evidence	for	our	claim	that	these	effects	are	part	of	a	broader	strategy	through	which	the	European
Commission	seeks	to	preserve	its	reputation	for	key	stakeholders.	By	being	stricter	with	member	states	in	which	its
behaviour	is	more	politicised,	it	signals	to	other	member	states	and	financial	markets,	among	others,	that	it	cannot	be
coerced	into	leniency.	By	signalling	political	independence	and	supervisory	resolve,	it	seeks	to	preserve	the
credibility	of	the	system	of	EU	economic	and	fiscal	supervision.
Ironically,	it	is	precisely	these	member	states	whose	publics	are	more	Eurosceptic	that	are	also	more	successful	in
weakening,	or	watering	down,	these	CSRs	during	the	amendment	phase	in	the	Council.	And	it	is	also	these	member
states	which	are	least	likely	to	actually	act	on	the	Commission’s	recommendations.	While	this	raises	questions	about
how	the	Commission	responds	to	such	activities	in	the	Council	and	vice	versa,	it	also	sheds	light	on	just	how	deeply
the	EU	has	been	penetrated	by	the	forces	of	politicisation:	even	in	relatively	technocratic	procedures	like	the
European	Semester,	politicisation	affects	the	behaviour	of	individual	actors	and	the	interaction	between	them.
Preliminary	results	suggest	a	similar	dynamic	is	at	play	in	the	EU’s	Excessive	Deficit	Procedure,	one	of	the	most
economically	significant	and	politically	contested	policies	in	the	EU	portfolio.	While	the	first	member	state	has	yet	to
be	sanctioned	under	this	procedure,	statistical	evidence	suggests	member	states	are	more	likely	to	enter	into	the
procedure	if	their	publics	have	more	polarised	opinions	on	the	EU.
Thus,	the	further	we	trace	the	effects	of	politicisation	to	the	more	insulated	elements	of	the	EU	polity,	the	more
evidence	of	its	effect	we	find.	This	begs	the	question	whether	there	is	any	part	of	the	EU	system	that	is	not	affected
by	political	dynamics	and	opposition	to	the	EU	at	the	national	level.
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It	also	raises	the	question	of	whether	the	current	political	design	of	the	EU	is	still	tenable.	If	the	constant	‘gaming’	of
the	system	by	blame-avoiding	member	states	forces	EU	institutions	to	unilaterally	adopt	strategies	of	depoliticisation
to	ensure	their	survival,	perhaps	a	substantial	revision	of	the	system	is	in	order.	Such	a	reform	could	strengthen	the
role	of	the	European	or	national	parliaments	in	EU	supervision	schemes,	which	can	act	as	lightning	rods	through
which	politicisation	is	captured	and	injected	into	EU	policy	processes	in	a	democratically	accountable	and
sustainable	fashion.
At	any	rate,	the	EU	is	no	longer	the	insulated,	technocratic	polity	it	was	once	made	out	to	be.	Business	as	usual	is
dead.	Or	perhaps	a	profoundly	politicised	EU	is	the	new	business	as	usual.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	draws	on	the	author’s	recent	study	in	European	Union	Politics.	The	article	gives	the	views	of
the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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